Heski Bar-Isaac (Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto)https://sites.google.com/site/heskibarisaac/home ; twitter: @profeski"Training, Recruitment, and Outplacement as Endogenous Adverse Selection“Abstract: We analyze a model of adverse selection in labor markets, where workers vary in match-speciffic as well as general productivity, and firms can shape the information available to rivals. Competition to recruit workers leads to an information structure that resembles outplacement (lots of information to potential employers on bad matches, little on good matches). This involves considerable adverse selection but no inefficiency and acts as a way for workers to effectively pay for efficient training. One consequence, in line with some empirical findings and in contrast to standard tests for adverse selection, is that wages of those who stay in the firm are on average higher than wages of those who leave.Heski Bar-Isaac is Professor, Economic Analysis and Policy Area, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. He is Managing editor of the Economic Journal, Associate editor of the RAND Journal of Economics, and serves on the Editorial Board of the American Economic Review.Selected publications:• Motivating Employees through Career Paths (with Raphaël Lévy), Journal of Labor Economics, accepted.• Raising Retailers' Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals (with John Asker), American Economic Review, February 2014, Vol 104(2): 672-86.• Search, Design, and Market Structure (with Guillermo Caruana and Vicente Cuñat), American Economic Review, April 2012, 102(2): 1140–1160.• How to Organize Crime (with Mariagiovanna Baccara) Review of Economic Studies, 2008, Volume 75(4), 1039–1067.• Something to Prove: Reputation in Teams, RAND Journal of Economics, (Summer 2007), Volume 38(2), 495–511.• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model, Review of Economic Studies, (April 2003), Volume 70(2), 231–251.