Dear colleagues,
The Department of Economics of the Vienna University of Economics and Business cordially invites you a research seminar on
Tuesday, November 5,
with
Zuzana Fungáčová,
(Bank of Finland)
on
"Political Cycles and Bank Lending in Russia"
Electoral autocracies provide possibilities and incentives to exert pressure on banks, both state-owned and private, so that lending would increase before elections. We employ monthly
data on individual banks to study whether Russian banks increase their lending before presidential elections during the period 2004-2018. We find that all Russian banks increase lending before presidential elections. This result stands for all loans but also
separately for firm and household loans. State-owned banks do not significantly differ from private banks in their lending behavior in election times. We test that the increase of loans before elections is not related to exogenous economic events: the surge
in loans is followed by higher amount of bad loans in the following year, while increased lending concerns predominantly larger banks and banks most involved in the lending activity. Our main conclusion is that all banks increase lending before presidential
elections in the Russian electoral autocracy. This supports the view that the authorities in an electoral autocracy can influence lending of both private and state-owned banks.
Time and place: Tuesday,
November 5, 14:00 –15:30,
Campus WU, Welthandelsplatz
1, 1020 Vienna, building D4, entrance A, 2nd floor, Department meeting room 2.008.
Best,
Jesus Crespo Cuaresma
Professor of Economics
Vienna University of Economics and Business
1020
Vienna (Austria)