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VIENNA JOINT
ECONOMICS
SEMINAR |
INVITATION |
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U P D A T E (title & paper of Thomas Gehrig’s presentation)
The University of Vienna and the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar
Thursday, May 12, 2016
University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna,
HS 15, 2nd floor
4:00 pm
Pierpaolo Battigalli
and Thomas Gehrig U Bocconi University of Vienna
A Framework for the Analysis of Self-Confirming Policies
(Pierpaolo Battigalli)
This paper provides a general framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies. We first study self-confirming equilibria in recurrent decision problems with incomplete information about the true stochastic model. Next we illustrate
the theory with a characterization of stationary monetary policies in a linear-quadratic setting. Finally we provide a more general discussion of self-confirming policies.
(Paper jointly with S. Cerreia-Vioglio, F. Maccheroni, M. Marinacci, T. Sargent) and
Using a new daily dataset for all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange, we study the impact of information asymmetry during the liquidity freeze and market run of October 1907 - one of the most severe financial crises of the 20th
century. We estimate that the run on the market increased spreads from 0.5% to 3% during the peak of the crisis and, using a spread decomposition, we also demonstrate that fears of informed trading account for most of that deterioration of liquidity. Information
costs rose most in the mining sector - the origin of the panic rumors - and in other sectors with poor track records of corporate reporting. In addition to wider spreads and tight money markets, we find other hallmarks of information-based illiquidity: trading
volume dropped and price impact rose. Importantly, despite short-term cash infusions into the market, the market remained relatively illiquid for several months following the panic. Also market illiquidity enters positively in the cross section of stock returns.
Moreover, we identify information risk as the main driver of illiquidity. Thus, our findings demonstrate how opaque markets can easily transmit an idiosyncratic rumor into a long-lasting, market-wide crisis. Our results also demonstrate the usefulness of illiquidity
measures to alert market participants to impending market runs. (Paper jointly with Caroline Fohlin (Emory University) and Marlene Haas (University of Vienna and VGSF))
We are looking forward to seeing you!
Institute for Advanced Studies
Josefstädter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: +43 1 599 91 145
e-Mail:
economics@ihs.ac.at
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