VIENNA JOINT ECONOMICS SEMINAR	INVITATION
The University of Vienna and the Department of Economics and Finance at the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar Thursday, June 11, 2015 University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna, HS 15, 2^nd floor 4:00 pm Nicolas Schutz                                   and                        William Zame University of Mannheim                                              UCLA Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly: An Aggregative Game Approach (Nicolas Schutz) Abstract: This paper introduces a new class of demand systems to study oligopolistic pricing games with multiproduct firms. We prove that this class of demand systems coincides with the set of demand systems that can be derived from discrete/continuous choice with iid type 1 extreme-value taste shocks. We also show that these demand systems are integrable with quasi-linear preferences. The pricing game is aggregative and payoff functions are uni-modal, although not necessarily quasi-concave. Firms' fitting-in and best-response functions can be entirely summarized by a uni-dimensional sufficient statistic, called the iota-markup. This allows to show that, under fairly weak conditions, the pricing game has a Nash equilibrium. Under stronger conditions, this equilibrium is unique. We also provide an algorithm which exploits the aggregative nature of the game to compute the pricing equilibrium with multiproduct firms and CES demands. The algorithm always converges. As an application, we derive a number of results on the dynamic optimality of myopic merger policy under differentiated Bertrand competition.   Endogenous Matching: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard on Demand (William Zame) Abstract: Technology has made a revolution in the provision and distribution of consumer goods. It is also making a (potential) revolution in the provision and distribution of services -- personal and corporate.   The provision of such services form what is being called the on-demand economy.  Understanding -- and guiding -- the on-demand economy presents many challenges. Typically, the output produced -- or the value of the service -- will depend  both on the characteristics of the worker and task and on the effort exerted by the worker. The characteristics of the task may be observable but the characteristics of the worker will usually not be observable -- so there will usually be the potential for adverse selection -- and the effort exerted by the worker will (almost by definition) not be observable -- so there will always be the potential for moral hazard.  This paper studies how endogenously matching workers to tasks can eliminate the adverse selection and mitigate moral hazard. paper jointly with Mihaela van der Schaar and Yuanzhang Xiao We are looking forward to seeing you! Institute for Advanced Studies Department of Economics and Finance Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Vienna, Austria Tel.: +43 1 599 91 145 e-Mail: economics@ihs.ac.at http://economics.ihs.ac.at		LINKS DIRECTIONS TO UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA on Google maps VIENNA JOINT ECONOMICS SEMINAR on Google calendar ECONOMICS SEMINARS IN VIENNA on Google calendar
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