Dear colleagues,

The Department of Economics cordially invites you to the WU Economics Research Seminar on Wednesday, October 4^th, with

Christoph Kuzmics

(University of Graz)

on

"Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values"

Abstract: An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria in such games. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs, interim Pareto efficient, and evolutionarily stable.

Date: Wednesday, October 4^th

Time: 4.30 to 6 pm (CET)

Location: building D4, ground floor, room D4.0.127

With best regards,

Harald Oberhofer

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Univ.-Prof. Dr. Harald Oberhofer

Department of Economics 

WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

Phone: +43/1/31336-4984

Email: harald.oberhofer@wu.ac.at

Webpage: https://www.wu.ac.at/ie/mitarbeiter/harald-oberhofer/

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)

Phone: +43/1/7982601-468

Email: harald.oberhofer@wifo.ac.at

Webpage: http://www.wifo.ac.at/harald_oberhofer