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VIENNA JOINT
ECONOMICS
SEMINAR |
INVITATION |
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The University of Vienna and the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar
Thursday, June 22, 2017
University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna,
VGSE seminar room, 3rd floor
1:15 pm
California Institute of Technology
Optimal Dynamic Matching
We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a tradeoff between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal
mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In decentralized settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify
the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by transfer schemes and by matching individuals in fixed time intervals. (joint work with with Mariagiovanna Baccara and SangMok Lee)
We are looking forward to seeing you!
Institute for Advanced Studies
Josefstädter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: +43 1 599 91 232
e-Mail: economics@ihs.ac.at
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LINKS
UNIVERSITY OF
VIENNA
VIENNA JOINT
ECONOMICS SEMINAR
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Diese Zusendung erfolgt entsprechend den Bestimmungen des TKG 247107. Sollten Sie keine weiteren Zusendungen wuenschen, senden Sie uns bitte eine kurze Mitteilung an:
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