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VIENNA JOINT

ECONOMICS

SEMINAR

INVITATION

 

R E M I N D E R

 

The University of Vienna and the Department of Economics and Finance at the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar

Thursday, March 26, 2015

University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna,

HS 5, ground floor

4:00 pm

 

Fabiano Schivardi                            and                        Hervé Crès

Università Bocconi                                                          NYU Abu Dhabi

 

                                            

The Impact of Female Leadership on Gender Gaps and Firm Performance (Fabiano Schivardi)

 

We analyze a matched employer-employee panel data set and find that female leadership has a positive effect on female wages at the top of the distribution, and a negative one at the bottom. Moreover, performance in firms with female leadership increases with the share of female workers. This evidence is consistent with a model where female executives are better equipped at interpreting signals of productivity from female workers. This suggests substantial costs of under-representation of women at the top: for example, if women became CEOs of firms with at least 20% female employment, sales per worker would increase 6.7%.

 

paper jointly with Luca Flabbi, Mario Macis and Andrea Moro

 

Economic Correctness: Why Incomplete Markets Might Never Fail. (Hervé Crès)

 

Incomplete markets fail to promote allocative efficiency because at equilibrium shareholders typically use different present values to discount future income flows. Moreover, since shareholders disagree on how to run the firms, an aggregation mechanism needs to be designed, and it is not granted that resulting collective choices are productively efficient. We challenge this conventional wisdom in a setup where agents have heterogenous beliefs by proposing a general equilibrium notion of reciprocal aggregation: Firms aggregate the preferences of shareholders, and reciprocally shareholders update their beliefs by aggregation of perceived firms’ (virtual) beliefs. We show how a mere unanimity condition for both aggregation mechanisms restores the first welfare theorem.

 

paper jointly with Mich Tvede

 

 

We are looking forward to seeing you!

 

Institute for Advanced Studies

Department of Economics and Finance

Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Vienna, Austria

Tel.: +43 1 599 91 145

e-Mail: economics@ihs.ac.at

http://economics.ihs.ac.at

 

 

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