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VIENNA JOINT
ECONOMICS
SEMINAR |
INVITATION |
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R E M I N D E R
The University of Vienna and the Department of Economics and Finance at the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar
Thursday, June 18, 2015 University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna,
HS 15, 2nd floor 4:00 pm
Miklos Koren
and
Bettina Klaus Central European University HEC, Lausanne
Bridges
(Miklos Koren)
Abstract: We build a continuous-space theory of trade in which people in a region agglomerate to exploit trading opportunities with another region. The regions are separated by a
river, which can be crossed anywhere, but more cheaply at bridges. In the model, most trade takes place via bridges, leading to a key prediction that population density declines with distance to the bridge. We derive additional predictions about the spatial
distribution of population and test them on current high-resolution population density data around twelve major American rivers. The data is mostly consistent with our model. In a historical event study of 19th-century bridges on these rivers, we find that
the neighborhood of bridges developed faster after the bridge was built. Also, the two sides of the bridge converged in development, highlighting the connecting role of the bridge. More generally, our results suggest that economies of density arising from
transport infrastructure can help explain why and where people agglomerate.
Object Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance: Strategy-Proofness and Comparative Statics
(Bettina Klaus) Abstract: We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents.
Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house
allocation problem, where at most one copy of each object is available, deferred acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm. For house allocation
we show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first
characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicitycharacterize
(the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. These choice functions are used by objects to reject agents in the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.
Therefore, in the general model resource-monotonicity is the "stronger" comparative statics requirement because it characterizes (together with our basic requirements and strategy-proofness) choice-based DA-mechanisms whereas population-monotonicity (together
with our basic properties and strategy-proofness) does not.
paper jointly with Lars Ehlers
We are looking forward to seeing you!
Institute for Advanced Studies
Department of Economics and Finance
Stumpergasse 56, 1060 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: +43 1 599 91 145
e-Mail: economics@ihs.ac.at
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