VIENNA JOINT ECONOMICS SEMINAR	INVITATION
The University of Vienna and the Department of Economics and Finance at the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar Thursday, October  15, 2015 Attention – New Address Institute for Advanced Studies Josefstädter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna Lecture Room E02, ground floor 4:00 pm Monica Martinez-Bravo and          Andriy Zapechelnyuk CEMFI                                                                 U Glasgow An Empirical Investigation of the Legacies of Non-Democratic Regimes: The Case of Suharto’s Mayors in Indonesia ( Monica Martinez-Bravo) Abstract: A large theoretical literature argues that the legacies of non-democratic regimes can affect the quality of governance in new democracies. However, the empirical evidence on the effects of these legacies is scarce. In this paper, we exploit a natural experiment that took place in the Indonesian democratic transition: the mayors of the Soeharto regime were allowed to finish their five year terms before being replaced by new leaders. Since mayors' political cycles were not synchronised, this event generated exogenous variation on how long the agents of the old regime remained in their position and, hence, on the degree of control that they exerted during the democratic transition. The results suggest that districts that had an old-regime mayor for longer exhibit worse governance outcomes and tend to vote more for Soeharto's party. These effects persist several years after the old-regime mayors are no longer in office. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that slower transitions towards democracy allow the old-regime elites to find ways to capture democracy in the medium and long run. (paper jointly with Priya Mukherjee) Persuading a Heterogeneous Audience (Andriy Zapechelnyuk) Abstract: We study Bayesian persuasion of a heterogeneous and privately informed audience. An example is a competitive market for a good with negative consumption externalities (e.g., cigarettes) in which a benevolent government can design an educational campaign about a payoff-relevant characteristic (e.g., the health risks of smoking). We allow for targeted persuasion in which the government can provide different information to different consumers and public persuasion in which all consumers are exposed to the same information. We establish equivalence of targeted and public persuasion, characterize optimal persuasion rules, and consider several applications. (paper jointly with Anton Kolotilin, Ming Li and Tymofiy Mylovanov) We are looking forward to seeing you! Institute for Advanced Studies Department of Economics and Finance Josefstädter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria Tel.: +43 1 599 91 145 e-Mail: economics@ihs.ac.at http://economics.ihs.ac.at		LINKS DIRECTIONS TO IHS on Google maps VIENNA JOINT ECONOMICS SEMINAR on Google calendar ECONOMICS SEMINARS IN VIENNA on Google calendar
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