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VIENNA JOINT
ECONOMICS
SEMINAR |
INVITATION |
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The University of Vienna and the Institute for Advanced Studies cordially invite you to the following Vienna Joint Economics Seminar
Thursday, April 14, 2016
University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, 1090 Vienna,
HS 15, 2nd floor
4:00 pm
Giancarlo Corsetti
and Christoph Kuzmics
University of Cambridge
University of Graz
Title tba
(Giancarlo Corsetti)
and
Abstract: Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent’s preferences.
We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting game of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent’s preferences is bounded away from zero
and one. (paper jointly with Florian Gauer)
We are looking forward to seeing you!
Institute for Advanced Studies
Josefstädter Straße 39, 1080 Vienna, Austria
Tel.: +43 1 599 91 145
e-Mail: economics@ihs.ac.at
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UNIVERSITY
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Diese Zusendung erfolgt entsprechend den Bestimmungen des TKG 247107. Sollten Sie keine weiteren Zusendungen wuenschen, senden Sie uns bitte eine kurze Mitteilung an:
economics@ihs.ac.at.
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Also sent to noeg-l@wu.ac.at (https://mailman.wu.ac.at/mailman/listinfo/noeg-l). |
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